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Abstract 
Value-based decision-making occurs whenever an organism makes a choice 
on the basis of its subjective preferences.  While value-based decisions have 
been traditionally regarded as a simple maximization problem, recent 
investigations suggest that cognitive functions such as visual attention have 
an impact on decision processes and, therefore, can drive choices.  These 
reports have shown strong correlations between eye movements and choice 
behavior, and suggest that visual comparisons of the available alternatives 
influence preferences. 
 However, despite the increasing evidence on the relationship between 
visual comparisons and choices, the issue of causality has remained unclear.  
In particular, it is unclear whether modulations of neuronal activity in attention-
related brain regions induce changes in choice behavior.  By combining brain 
stimulation and computational techniques, I investigate the causal role of 
visual comparisons on value-based decision-making.   A first study explores 
the role of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) – a brain region involved in both 
visual attention and value-based decision-making – during simple value-
based decisions.  Our results indicate that inter-hemispheric transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) on the PPC induce spatial biases in visual 
comparison processes, which in turn, lead to spatial biases on choice.  A 
second study examines the role of the right Frontal Eye Field (FEF) - a brain 
area that is mainly involved in attentional processes - in simple value-based 
choices.  This study shows that inhibitory transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) on the right FEF reduces the influence of visual comparisons in the 
decision process. 
 Traditional views on decision-making have been also challenged by 
empirical data showing that preferences can be context-dependent.  For 
example, decision-makers tend to prefer a sure option to a risky prospect 
when the alternatives are presented as gains, even when both options have 
the same expected value.  However, if options are presented as losses this 
aversion to risk is reduced, even though options remain the same in terms of 
outcomes.  In a third study, we examine which is the role of visual 
comparisons in frame-depended preferences.  This study shows that 
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contextual information about the available options can lead the decision-
maker to engage more in visual comparison processes.  This increased 
influence of visual comparisons on the decision process, in turn, modulates 
the decision-maker’s choice tendency. 
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General introduction 
 
The capacity to make decisions and implement goal-directed actions is central 
to humans, animals and, more recently, non-biological organisms.  This is a 
reason why the study of decision-making is in the interest of many disciplines, 
including economics, neuroscience, psychology, computer science and 
statistics.   
Generally speaking, there are two types of decisions: Perceptual 
decisions, determined by objective states of the physical world, and value-
based decisions, which are based on the subjective preferences of the 
decision-maker.  Preferential choices have been a central topic in economics 
and normative theories in this field assume that individuals are consistent 
across their decisions (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).  However, this 
assumption has been challenged by empirical evidence showing that choices 
can be influenced by contextual information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; 
Kahneman Tversky, A., 1979; McNeil et al., 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981).   In addition to these data, recent investigations suggest that they can 
also be influenced by visual comparisons of available options (Ashby et al., 
2016; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016; Kovach et al., 
2014; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; 
Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 
2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015).. 
In this dissertation I present three studies that investigate the 
computational and neural mechanisms related to visually guided comparisons 
in value-based decision-making (see appendix).  Study 1 explores the role of 
the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) – a brain region involved in both the 
representation of value and attentional processes.  Study 2 examines the role 
of the right Frontal Eye Field (FEF) – a cortical area involved, mainly, in visual 
attention.  Study 3 examines the link between visual comparisons and 
context-dependent decisions. 
In the introductory chapter, I summarize the theoretical framework of 
evidence-accumulation - which has guided these three studies - as well as 
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findings on its neurobiological basis. Then, I give an overview of recent 
findings on the relationship between visual comparisons and value-based 
choice.  The three studies will be summarized in the second chapter. Finally, 
a general discussion and conclusion form the third chapter.  
Decision-making and evidence accumulation 
While preferential choices have been traditionally studied in economics, 
investigations in neuroscience and psychophysics have approached decision-
making with experimental studies on perceptual choices. These investigations 
have generally focused on both choice outcomes and decision speed, when 
individuals have to classify noisy sensory information.  Because of this 
approach, these studies have repeatedly shown that individuals do not 
implement choices instantaneously, but the time required to take action varies 
according to the quality of the sensory stimulation (Bogacz et al., 2010; 
Chittka et al., 2009; Schouten and Bekker, 1967; Wickelgren, 1977).  Simply 
put, this documentation suggest that, in order to be accurate, decision-makers 
have to invest more time when facing ambiguous sensory input. On the 
contrary, when facing sensory input with low uncertainty decision-makers tend 
to be faster.  This need to invest time in order to achieve a certain level of 
perceptual accuracy – also named “speed-accuracy trade-off” – has led 
researcher to believe that decision-makers gradually accumulate sensory 
information in time until the accumulated perceptual input provides enough 
evidence in favor of one alternative of the decision problem. 
 In order to formally capture this dynamical decision process, many 
mathematical models - known as “sequential sampling models” - have been 
proposed (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Laming, 1968; Ratcliff and 
McKoon, 2008; Roe et al., 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970).  
The common trait of all these models is that they characterize the evidence 
accumulation process as a decision variable that evolves stochastically in 
time until it reaches a threshold corresponding to one option (Bogacz, 2007; 
Bogacz et al., 2006; Deco et al., 2013; Mulder et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 
2009). 
 The concept of evidence accumulation has become appealing because 
its mathematical formulations allow researcher to decompose decision 
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processes in order to identify latent cognitive mechanisms underlying 
behavioral observations (de Gee et al., 2017; Mulder et al., 2012, 2014).  In 
addition to this methodological advantage, findings in humans and non-
humans primates have shown patterns of neuronal activity that might support 
accumulation processes.  For instance, during a visual motion direction 
discrimination task, neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) cortex of macaque 
monkeys exhibit a gradual increase in their firing rate. When facing very 
ambiguous motion stimuli, subjects are slower and LIP neuronal activity 
increases at a slow rate.  On the contrary, when the visual information is 
clear, subjects are faster and LIP neurons activity increases at a fast rate.  
Furthermore, independently of the level of difficulty, LIP neurons reached the 
same level of activation when subjects initiated their response. Similar to 
sequential sampling models, these patterns of neuronal activity mimic 
evidence accumulation process with a boundary-crossing criterion (Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013).  In 
line with these results, another study has shown that electrophysiological 
signals from the human parietal cortex reflect accumulation-related brain 
activity during perceptual decisions (O’Connell et al., 2012). 
 Recently, value-based decision-making has become an important topic 
in the field of neuroscience, and a central goal in this line of research is to 
understand which are the cognitive, computational and neurobiological 
mechanisms that allow decision-makers to implement this type of choices 
(Rangel et al., 2008).  Several of these investigations have studied value-
based choices with the conceptual and formal framework of evidence 
accumulation (Basten et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2011; Hare et al., 2011; 
Hunt et al., 2012; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010, 2015; De 
Martino et al., 2012; Philiastides and Ratcliff, 2013; Polanía et al., 2014; Roe 
et al., 2001; Tajima et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013).  Here, it is important to 
precise that a general assumption of accumulation models for value-based 
decisions is that evidence is not provided by one stream of noisy sensory 
information, but by the subjective values that the decision-maker assign to 
each option.   
One of these studies, for instance, has combined functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) with a neurally adapted evidence accumulation 
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model in order to identify brain networks involved in value-based decision-
process.  The authors found a correlation between activity in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the subjective values of available options.  
Furthemore, the neurally adapted accumulation model predicted activity in the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS), which 
suggest a relationship between this areas and the process of comparing 
option values.  This view is also supported by further functional connectivity 
analyses, which revealed an enhanced coupling between these areas and 
motor regions in charge of implementing the choice (Hare et al., 2011).   
Another investigation has shown that evidence accumulation 
processes for value-based decisions are, nonetheless, distinguishable from 
those of perceptual decisions at the neural level.  In this study, subjects 
perform a perceptual and a value-based task with same visual stimuli.  
Therefore, it was possible for the authors to compare within-subjects 
behavioral and neuronal patterns from both tasks.  Results from this study 
showed that, in both type of choices, oscillations at the gamma band 
correlated with evidence accumulation processes predicted by a sequential 
sampling model.  Importantly, these accumulation-related gamma oscillations 
were also observed in frontal regions, but only during value-based choices.  
Additionally, fronto-parietal synchronization was stronger in value-based 
decision (Polanía et al., 2014).  According to the authors, these results 
indicate that an additional process is performed in value-based decisions. The 
implementation of subjective value signals might be this process. 
Decision-making and visually guided comparisons 
In order to choose, a decision-maker has to compare the available options.  
This statement raises an important question:  Which are the mechanisms that 
allow decision-makers to compare available alternatives? There has been an 
increasing interest in this question and recent studies have particularly 
focused in the role of attention-related processes during value-based choice. 
 Several studies have shown strong correlations between choice and 
gaze patterns (Ashby et al., 2016; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Konovalov and 
Krajbich, 2016; Kovach et al., 2014; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et 
al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et al., 2003; 
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Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015). More 
precisely, these reports have shown that, in decisions involving attractive 
options, more gaze/dwell time is allocated on the chosen alternative 
compared to the others. 
 The relationship between gaze and choices has been mathematically 
characterized with a Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) that assumes an influence of 
attentional process in accumulation of evidence.  The main difference 
between this attentional DDM (aDDM) and traditional sequential sampling 
models is that the aDDM incorporates a parameter that discounts the 
unattended option value and, thus, bias the decision process in favor of the 
attended one (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010). 
In addition to this report, other investigations obtain empirical evidence 
for the influence of visual comparisons in decision-making.  These studies 
have tried to influence choice behavior by manipulating the amount 
gaze/dwell time that subjects spend on each option.   One of those studies 
showed that control of gaze/dwell time had indeed differential effects - 
however small – in choice behavior.  When decision makers had to choose 
between attractive options, increasing the gaze/dwell time of one alternative 
(from 300 to 900 ms) led to a higher likelihood of choosing that option (7%) 
(Armel et al., 2008).  An fMRI study used a similar task and showed effects of 
similar sizes.  One important distinction is that this study examined the effect 
of gaze across many difficulty levels (hard decision involving options with very 
similar values and easy decisions involving options with very different values) 
and showed that gaze/dwell time control mainly affected hard decisions. The 
imaging data from this study showed that activity in the vmPFC and ventral 
striatum (vStr) correlated with the difference in value between the attended 
and the unattended items (Lim et al., 2011).  A particular limitation in these 
two experiments is that the manipulation of gaze allocation does not imply a 
manipulation of attentional processes during choice.  In natural conditions, 
visual attention and gaze are closely coupled.  However, when eye 
movements are constrained, the orienting and control of visual attention can 
be deployed covertly (Carrasco, 2011).  
Nonetheless, a recent study has shown that patients with damage on 
dorsomedia prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) exhibit an exaggerated influence of 
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visual comparisons on choice, while patients with damage on vmPFC do not 
show this bias. These findings suggest that the dmPFC, is causally involved in 
controlling the relative influence of visual comparisons in decision-making 
(Vaidya and Fellows, 2015). 
 Finally, a recent study has provided, for the first time, evidence for 
cellular-level mechanisms at the basis of attention-guided value-based 
choices (McGinty et al., 2016).  Previous neurophysiological investigations in 
non-human primates have shown that the values of offered and chosen 
options are correlated with the activity of some neurons in the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008, 2006).  In light of these 
results, researchers in this recent study examined the response of OFC 
neurons to value-associated visual cues, when macaques performed a free 
viewing task.  Their results show that a majority of OFC neurons encoded the 
distance between the overtly attended area of the screen and the cue, but 
when this distance was short, activity in some of OFC neurons was modulated 
by associated value of the cue. 
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Overview of the studies 
Study 1: tDCS on the PPC bias visual comparisons and choices  
 
Background 
Recent investigations suggest that, during value-based decisions, visual 
comparisons of the available options temporarily bias the decision process in 
favor of the attended alternative and, therefore, guide preferences (Krajbich 
and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010).  While these and other reports 
(Ashby et al., 2016; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016; 
Kovach et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et al., 
2003; Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015) 
have shown strong correlations between gaze patterns and choice behavior, it 
is still unclear whether it is possible to modulate the neural mechanisms at the 
basis of this visually guided decision process in order to influence choice.   
The PPC is a brain area involved in both, decision-making processes 
(Filimon et al., 2013; Hare et al., 2011; Heekeren et al., 2004; Platt and 
Glimcher, 1999; Polanía et al., 2014; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Sugrue et 
al., 2004) and the allocation of visual attention (Corbetta et al., 2005; Giglia et 
al., 2011; Hilgetag et al., 2001; Kinsbourne, 1977; Nyffeler et al., 2008; 
Sparing et al., 2009; Vuilleumier, 2013; Vuilleumier et al., 1996).  Therefore, 
this region might be involved in attentional modulation of choice.  In this study 
we explored how modulations of neuronal activity in the PPC, by means of 
tDCS, alter choice behavior.  Based on previous findings on the PPC, we 
tested two competing hypotheses about the effects of stimulation.  On the one 
hand, previous studies have shown that lesions and inhibitory stimulation of 
the right PPC induce attentional biases towards the right side of the visual 
scene.  Interestingly, in the case of tDCS, it has been reported that bi-
hemispheric Left anodal/Right cathodal stimulation on the PPC (LA-RC) leads 
to stronger effects than inhibitory unilateral stimulation (i.e. only cathodal 
stimulation on the right PPC) (Giglia et al., 2011; Hilgetag et al., 2001; Nyffeler 
et al., 2008; Sparing et al., 2009).  Thus, according to our first hypothesis, LA-
RC tDCS on the PPC would induce an attentional bias towards alternatives 
presented on the right side of the visual display.  This attentional bias would, 
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in turn, increase the tendency to choose these options.  On the other hand, 
studies in decision-making indicate that the PPC is also involved in the 
representation of value (Kahnt et al., 2014; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Polanía 
et al., 2014) and evidence-accumulation processes underlying choice 
(Heekeren et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2012; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002).  
Based on these reports, our second hypothesis stipulates that bilateral tDCS 
on the PPC would alter the contribution of attended and unattended options 
during the decision process. 
 
Methods 
Forty human subjects (16 females) participated in the experiment. In a first 
task, subjects rated 148 food items.  This rating task gave us a measure of 
the subjective value for each food item and allowed us to exclude disliked 
items. In a second task, participants made 195 decisions between pairs of 
positively rated food items. Subjects performed the choice task while receiving 
bi-hemispheric tDCS over the posterior parietal cortex (PPC). One group of 
subjects (n = 14) received left cathodal–right anodal stimulation (LC-RA), a 
second group (n = 13) received left anodal–right cathodal stimulation (LA-
RC), and a third group received Sham stimulation (n = 13). 
In each trial, one of the food items was presented on the left and the 
other on the right side of the screen. Decisions were self-paced and were 
made using the computer keyboard. The food items we presented in the 
choice task were selected such that – for each participant – the difference in 
ratings between the left and right items (VD = left item value - right item value) 
was constrained to be -1, 0 or +1, with an equal number of trials (65) of each. 
This was done to focus on difficult choice problems where tDCS-induced 
changes in the decision process would be more likely to change the choice 
outcomes. Subjects knew that at the end of the experiment, one trial would be 
selected at random and that they had to eat the food item that they chose in 
that trial (see Materials and Methods section in Appendix A).  
To test our two alternative hypotheses, we analyzed possible 
stimulation effects on subjects’ choice behavior.  We ran a logistic mixed-
effects regression of the likelihood of choosing the left food item as the 
dependent variable, with value difference (VD = left item value – right item 
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value), overall value (OV = left item value + right item value) and stimulation 
group dummies as independent variables. We also included interactions of 
OV and VD with the stimulation group dummies and random effects to 
account for repeated within-subject measures.  Then we analyzed subjects’ 
reaction times (RTs) with an analogous linear mixed-effects regression. 
Finally, we ran a third mixed-effects logistic regression to further identify any 
effects of tDCS on choice consistency (i.e., the likelihood of choosing the item 
with the higher rating). We only included choices between unequally rated 
items (VD 	 0) in this analysis (See Supplementary material of Appendix A). 
To test how the effects of the different tDCS montages could best be 
explained, we simulated an attentional version of a Drift-Diffusion Model 
(aDDM) (See Materials and Methods section).  This theoretical framework 
allowed us to decompose the decision process and estimate which of its 
aspects was modulated by stimulation. 
 
Results and conclusion 
In our first analysis, we could not observe a main effect from LA-RC or LC-RA 
tDCS on choices.  However, relative to the baseline Sham group, subjects 
receiving LA-RC stimulation were more likely to choose the left item as the 
OV increased.  Note that this choice bias in favor of the left option is opposite 
of the one predicted by the first hypothesis.  Additionally, no interaction effect 
was observed between LC-RA stimulation and OV.  Our analysis on RTs 
revealed that, in general, subjects were faster in decision with higher OV.  
Relative to the Sham group, this effect was stronger with LC-RA stimulation, 
but not with LA-RC stimulation.  Finally, our analysis on choice consistency 
revealed that subjects receiving LC-RA stimulation were less consistent with 
their earlier ratings than subjects in the baseline Sham group. However, this 
effect was not observed with LA-RC stimulation. 
 These complex behavioral patterns provide evidence against our first 
hypothesis.  Could our second hypothesis – which states that tDCS 
modulates the contribution of attended and unattended options during the 
decision process – explain them?  To test this hypothesis, we used the aDDM 
to examine the simplest stimulation-induced parameter changes that can 
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account for these behavioral patterns pattern. More precisely, we tested 
different parameterizations of the model that simulated symmetric tDCS-
induced changes in the decision process.  Only one of these models could 
replicate these behavioral patterns.  This model is based on the idea that LA-
RC stimulation induces a stronger discount on the value of the unattended 
option at the right side of the visual scene, while LC-RA leads to a stronger 
discount of the alternative at the left side when unattended.  These results 
support the idea that bilateral tDCS over the PPC causes a symmetric spatial 
bias in the integration of value, resulting in biased choices. 
 
Study 2: Inhibitory TMS on the right FEF reduces the influence of 
visual comparisons on choice 
 
Background 
It is widely agreed that an important function of visual attention is to allocate 
greater computational resources to elements of interest in the visual scene, at 
the cost of diminishing the processing of unattended components (Carrasco, 
2011; Chelazzi et al., 2011; Itti and Koch, 2001).  In line with this view, recent 
investigations suggest that, when facing different rewards, a decision-maker 
engages in visually guided comparisons that bias the decision process in 
favor of the attended alternative (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 
2010).  However it is not clear whether modulations of neuronal activity at the 
basis of visual attention processes lead to changes in choice behavior. 
 The control of visual attention is based on a large brain network 
(Chelazzi et al., 2011; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Gilbert and Li, 2013; 
Squire et al., 2013). However, large amount of evidence in both humans 
(Corbetta et al., 2002; Grosbras and Paus, 2002; Ruff et al., 2006; Saygin and 
Sereno, 2008; Serences et al., 2005; Silvanto et al., 2006) and non-human 
primates (Ekstrom et al., 2008; Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Moore et al., 
2003; Thompson et al., 1997, 2005) have repeatedly confirmed the crucial 
role of the FEF on the selective allocation of attention.  Additionally, unlike the 
PPC, this cortical area has not been related to the representation of value.  
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Combining TMS, eye tracking and computational modeling techniques, 
we conducted a study to test whether neural computations in the right FEF 
guide value-based decisions. 
 
Methods 
Forty-five subjects (20 females) participated in the experiment.  In a first task, 
subjects rated 148 food items.  This rating task gave us a measure of their 
subjective value for each food item and allowed us to exclude disliked items.  
After the rating task, subjects received inhibitory continuous theta burst TMS 
(Huang et al., 2005) over the right FEF (n = 23) or control stimulation on the 
vertex (n = 22).  Right after stimulation subjects performed a self-paced binary 
choice task (180 decisions) between pairs of positively rated food items. The 
food items we presented were selected such that – for each participant – the 
difference in ratings between the left and right items (VD = left item value - 
right item value) was constrained to be -1, 0 or +1. As mentioned before, this 
was done to focus on difficult choice problems where attention is more likely 
to change the choice outcomes.  Additionally, this task had two conditions. In 
the high OV condition, subjects had to choose between two very appetitive 
(highly rated) foods, whereas decisions in the low OV condition only involved 
slightly appetitive (low rated) options.  During this task, subjects gaze patterns 
were recorded with an eye tracker. 
 We ran a logistic mixed-effects regression in which the choice of the 
longer attended food item was the dependent variable, with a dummy variable 
for FEF-TMS group, the dwell time advantage and the OV condition as fixed 
effects, and all their interactions. We also used random effects for repeated 
measures within subjects. Subjects’ decision speed was analyzed with a 
linear mixed-effects regression of RTs, with stimulation group, OV condition 
and their interaction as fixed effects, and random effects for repeated 
measures within subjects (see Supplementary Tables 3 and 4 for a detailed 
description of the regression results). 
Finally, we fitted the aDDM to the individual data of each participant 
with maximum likelihood estimations (MLE) in order to examine which aspect 
of the decision process was modulated by FEF-TMS. 
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Results and conclusions 
With regard to choices and RTs, we tested specific hypotheses based on the 
aDDM.  The aDDM predicts that subjects in the Vertex group should be 
inclined to select the longest attended alternative and, during high OV 
decisions, this choice tendency should be stronger and coupled with faster 
responses.  We confirmed that, indeed, during low OV decisions, subjects 
were more inclined to choose a food item as its dwell-time advantage (relative 
to the other option) increased. Additionally, this choice tendency in favor of 
the longest attended item was enhanced during high OV decisions and 
coupled with shorter RTs.   
We also hypothesized that inhibitory TMS on the right FEF would 
decrease the influence of visual comparisons in the decision process.  
According to our computational model, this stimulation effect would lead to a 
reduced choice tendency in favor of the longest attended item and longer RTs 
in comparison to the Vertex group.  Importantly, the aDDM implies that FEF-
TMS should particularly affect choices and decision speed during high OV 
decisions.  This was also corroborated by our results.  During high OV 
decisions, subjects who received inhibitory TMS over the FEF were less likely 
to choose the longest attended food item and displayed a greater proportion 
of slow responses than the control group.  
When comparing the parameters of subjects in both groups, we 
observed that participants in the FEF-TMS group had in general a weaker 
attentional discount than participants in the control group.  Furthermore, we 
could not observe difference between stimulation groups, with respect of the 
other parameters.  Taking together these effects show that inhibitory TMS on 
the right FEF modulates the influence of visual comparisons in decision-
making.  
 
Study 3: Visual comparisons and context-depended preferences 
 
Background 
Standard economic theory assumes that choices can be represented as a 
simple maximization process, and therefore preferences should be context-
	 13	
independent (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).  However, empirical 
data has challenged this view by showing that contextual information 
influences preferences.  For instance, Kahneman and Tversky have shown 
that humans tend to prefer sure options over risky prospects when 
alternatives are presented as gains, but this aversion to risk if diminished if 
the alternatives are presented as losses - even though both decision 
problems are identical in terms of possible outcomes (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984; Kahneman Tversky, A., 1979). 
 While context-dependent choices have been largely documented in 
humans and other species (Lea and Ryan, 2015; Louie et al., 2013; Shafir et 
al., 2002), we still know relatively little about the cognitive or computational 
mechanisms that drives them.  In this study, we examine the influence of 
value comparisons in choice biases related to loss and gain frames during 
risky decision problems.  
 
Methods 
Thirty subjects (12 females) participate in our experiment. They were asked to 
make a series of binary decisions (140) between a risky option (a gamble) 
and a sure alternative (a safe option) that had the same expected value (EV). 
Each trial started with an initial monetary endowment.  Additionally, the safe 
option was framed as a gain in one condition or as a loss in another condition.  
Thus, this experimental design allowed us to test the effect of framing within 
subjects.  During the choice task, we also recorded subjects’ gaze patterns. 
 To analyze subjects choices, we conducted a logistic mixed-effects 
regression in which the choice of the safe option was the dependent variable, 
with a dummy variable for Frame condition, the percentage of dwell time on 
the safe option and its EV as fixed effects, together with all their interactions. 
We used random effects for repeated measures within subjects.  Subjects’ 
RTs were analyzed by means of a linear mixed-effects regression, with Frame 
condition and EV as fixed effects, together with all their interactions. We also 
used random effects for repeated measures within subjects. 
 In order to assess the role of visual comparisons in the observed 
choices, we also tested the predictive performance of two dynamical 
computational models.  As the aDDM, our first model characterizes the 
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decision as an evidence accumulation process guided by visual comparisons.  
On the contrary, our alternative model assumes that accumulation of evidence 
is independent of gaze patterns.  We fitted both models to the individual data 
of each subject, separately for the Gain frame condition and the Loss frame 
condition.  This fitting procedure allowed us to estimate parametric changes 
across framing conditions and, thus, determine whether changes in visual 
comparison processes where linked to changes in preferences (See the 
Introduction section of appendix 1 for a detailed description of the models). 
 
Results and conclusions 
We observed that subjects had a strong tendency to choose the safe option 
and this tendency was stronger as the EV of the options increased.  However, 
in the Loss frame conditions this tendency was weaker.  This indicates that, in 
general, choices were influenced by the contextual information of the safe 
option’s frame.  Importantly, we also observed strong relationships between 
choices and gaze patterns.  The tendency to choose the safe option was 
stronger as the total gaze/dwell time allocated on this alternative increased.  
Additionally, this effect was enhanced when subjects faced options with 
higher EV.  Finally, we observed that when the safe option had a higher 
gaze/dwell time advantage, the influence of the Loss frame in choices was 
weaker.  With respect of RTs, we observed that subjects were faster when 
facing options with higher EV but, compared to the Gain frame condition, this 
effect decreased in the loss frame condition. 
Following analyses examined how well our two competing theoretical 
frameworks replicated these behavioral patterns.  These analyses revealed 
that the attentional accumulator model characterized choices with greater 
accuracy than the alternative model.  This result indicates that visual 
comparisons played a role in these decisions.   
Following analyses on the parameterizations of the attention 
accumulator model showed that, according to this model, subjects give a 
greater weight to the safe option (compared to the weight of the gamble) in 
both the Gain frame and the Loss frame condition. These analyses also 
revealed that the parameter capturing the attentional influence on choice (the 
parameter discounting the EV of the unattended option) was significantly 
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affected by framing.  In other words, parameter estimations of this model 
suggest that, in the Loss frame condition, the discount of the unattended 
option is stronger than in the Gain frame condition. These frame-dependent 
modulations were not observed in any other parameter of this model.  Thus, 
the attentional accumulator model explains the observed choice patterns as 
follows: First, the decision process starts with an initial bias, which leads to 
the tendency to choose the safe option.  Second, despite this initial bias in the 
decision process, evidence accumulation does not progress continuously on 
its advantage, but can change in favor of the gamble when attended.  Third, a 
stronger influence of visual comparisons during the Loss frame condition 
further decreases the safe option’s advantage on evidence accumulation, and 
therefore, weakens the tendency to choose this alternative.  Analogous 
analyses showed that the alternative model was not able to capture framing-
dependent changes in preferences with framing-dependent changes in 
specific aspects of the decision process. 
Our attentional accumulator model explains within-subjects frame-
dependent changes in choices, but also between-subjects differences with 
respect of the susceptibility to framing. Additional analyses showed that 
subjects with stronger frame-dependent modulations of the attentional 
discount experienced a stronger influence of frame in their choices.  
To summarize, our results indicate that, in response to the presentation 
of available options, individuals modulate their investment in visual 
comparisons.  These frame-dependent modulations of visual comparisons, in 
turn, lead to frame-dependent choices.  Furthermore, our results also show 
that attention-related components of decision processes also explain why 
some decision-makers are more influenced by the presentation of options 
than others. 
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General discussion 
Study 1 
The first study tests two hypotheses on how tDCS over the PPC affects 
simple value-based choices.  On the one hand, the first hypothesis was 
specific to one tDCS montage and stipulates that that LA-RC stimulation 
induces a bias in attentional focus towards the option at the right side of the 
visual scene that, in turn, would increase the likelihood of choosing this 
option.  On the other hand, the second hypothesis suggests that bi-
hemispheric tDCS over the PPC modulates the contribution of attended and 
unattended options in the decision process.   
Data from our experiment showed a complex behavioral pattern. 
However, the observed behavior refuted the first hypothesis because, as the 
OV of the decision increased, subjects receiving LA-RC tDCS were more 
likely to choose the food item at the left side of the screen than subjects in the 
control group.  To examine if this complex behavioral patterns could be 
explained by the second hypothesis, we simulated the aDDM with symmetric 
tDCS-induced changes in its parameters.  Only a model based on the idea 
that LA-RC and LC-RA tDCS produces symmetric changes in the discount of 
unattended options could capture these behavioral patterns.  These results 
suggest that our bilateral montage of LA-RC (LC-RA) increases the discount 
in the evidence accumulation process for an unattended right (left) option but 
has no effect on the discount factor for an unattended left (right) option.   
It is important to note that we tested a restricted space of models, 
because our goal was to find the most parsimonious explanation for the 
observed behavioral effects.  Nonetheless, with this procedure we were able 
to obtain a unifying explanation of the observed behavioral patterns.   
Additionally, our simulations were based on gaze patterns obtained in a 
previous report (Krajbich et al., 2010) and, thus, our modeling exercise is 
based on the assumption that active tDCS montages did no alter gaze 
patterns. While the observed data rejected the first hypothesis (which implies 
an effect of LA-RC stimulation on the gaze allocation), future investigations 
should include analyses of gaze patterns in order to further assess the effects 
that tDCS over the PPC has on choice behavior. 
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An important question is how tDCS affects interconnected areas during 
value-based decisions. Previous investigations support the idea that 
synchronized fronto-parietal activity is a neural fingerprint of value-based 
choices (Hunt et al., 2012; Polanía et al., 2014, Siegel et al. 2008) and it is 
possible that the effects of our tDCS montages involve a reduced sensitivity of 
parietal areas for signals originating in the frontal cortex (Polania et al, 2015).  
Additionally, several investigations suggest that causal manipulations of 
neural activity parietal, frontal and collicular regions lead to asymmetric inter-
hemispheric interaction and, therefore, biases in motor and perceptual 
functions (Filmer et al., 2015; Funk and Pettigrew, 2003; Giglia et al., 2011; 
Hummel and Cohen, 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2004; Lefebvre et al., 2012; 
Sparing et al., 2009; Takeuchi et al., 2009; Weddell, 2004; Wright and 
Krekelberg, 2014). Our study provides suggestive evidence for the role of 
these inter-hemispheric dynamics in value-based choice and motivates further 
research into the precise underlying mechanisms. 
 To summarize, we combined tDCS and computational modeling 
techniques to demonstrate that value-based choices can be manipulated by 
stimulating PPC. Our results support the idea that bilateral tDCS over the 
PPC modulates the contribution of attended and unattended options, resulting 
in spatially biased choices. 
 
Study 2 
Based on the aDDM, we designed an experiment to test whether the right 
FEF is causally linked to value-based decisions.   As predicted by our model, 
subjects receiving control stimulations were more likely to choose the longest 
attended option than the other alternative, and during high OV decision this 
choice tendency was stronger and coupled high shorter RTs.  We also 
hypothesized that inhibitory TMS over the right FEF decreases the influence 
of visual comparisons in the decision-making process.  According to our 
theoretical framework, this effect should then diminish the tendency to choose 
the longest attended option and increase RTs, but especially during decisions 
with high OV condition.  We observed, indeed, that subjects in the FEF-TMS 
group were slower and less likely to choose the longest attended option than 
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subjects in the control group, and these effects were specific to the high OV 
condition.   Finally, for every subject we fitted the aDDM and results from 
parameter estimations support the idea that FEF-TMS modulated the 
influence of visually guided comparisons during the decision process.   
 In light of these results it is natural to ask which are the neuronal 
mechanism that allow visual attention to modulate value-based decision 
processes.  Research in perceptual decision-making have shown that 
subjects have greater sensitivity (Barbot et al., 2011; Herrmann et al., 2010; 
Montagna et al., 2009; Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005; Pestilli et al., 2007) and 
stronger neuronal responses in the visual cortex (Connor et al., 1997; Kastner 
et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2005; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2002; O’Craven et 
al., 1997; Reynolds and Desimone, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2000) for attended 
visual stimuli than unattended ones.  Additionally, large evidence suggest that 
these attention-dependent behavioral effects and its neural correlates are 
linked to modulations of neuronal activity in the FEF (Gregoriou et al., 2009; 
Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Moore and Fallah, 2004; Ruff et al., 2006; 
Silvanto et al., 2006).  It might be possible that visually guided comparisons of 
value rise from a similar mechanism. A recent investigation suggest that 
neuronal representations of value can be modulated by visual attention (Lim 
et al., 2011).  Additionally, recent studies have revealed that fronto-parietal 
synchronization at the gamma frequency is a neuronal fingerprint of value-
based decision processes and decreasing the degree of coherence between 
parietal and frontal activity leads to inaccurate choices (Polanía et al., 2014, 
2015). 
 Taking together, our findings demonstrate the relevance of the right 
FEF for attention-dependent modulations of value-based decision processes, 
and, more generally, they suggest directions for future investigations on the 
interaction between visual-attention brain networks and areas exhibiting 
value-signals. 
 
Study 3 
Based on previous documentation on the influence of visual comparisons 
processes in decision-making, we conducted a study to explore the role of 
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these processes in context-dependent preferences.  Subjects showed a 
strong inclination to choose a safe option over a gamble when the sure 
alternative was framed as a gain, and this choice tendency was specially 
pronounced when the decision problem involved options with high EV.  
However, when the safe option was presented as a loss, the propensity to 
choose the safe option was reduced.  This result confirmed that subjects’ 
preferences were influenced by the contextual information provided by 
framing.  Interestingly - in line with previous documentation (Ashby et al., 
2016; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Kovach et al., 2014; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; 
Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et al., 
2003; Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015) - we 
also observed that this choice tendency was stronger as the gaze/dwell time 
advantage of the safe option increased.   
We then compared the predictive performance of two sequential 
sampling models on the observed choices.  The first model characterizes the 
decisions as a process of evidence accumulation influenced by visually 
guided comparisons of the available options.  On the contrary, the second 
model does not assume an influence of value comparisons.  Results on model 
fits corroborated that the attentional accumulator model predicted choice 
behavior with greater accuracy than the alternative model.   
According to the attentional accumulator model, subjects start the 
decision process with an initial bias in favor of the safe option but visual 
comparisons reduce the impact of this bias on choice behavior. Importantly, 
this model also suggests that subjects are generally more engaged in visual 
comparisons during Loss frame decisions (relative to Gain frame decisions), 
and therefore less driven by the initial bias of the decision process.  Simply 
put, this model suggests that, compared to Gain frame decisions, subjects are 
further engaged in visual comparisons during Loss frame decisions. In 
addition, our model also captures between-subject variability in context-
dependent choice behavior.  More precisely, this model indicates that subjects 
who are strongly (weakly) engaged in visual comparisons show big (small) 
framing-dependent changes in preferences.  According to recent research 
decision-makers who know in advance which option to select are less 
invested in a visual comparison process. On the contrary, when choices are 
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not determine in advance, these comparisons can influence preferences 
(Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016).  Our results are in line with this 
documentation.   
A previous investigation has shown that the effect of framing on 
choices is correlated with modulations of neuronal activity in the amygdala 
(De Martino et al., 2006).  According to the authors, these modulations might 
reflect shifts from predominantly “emotionally-based” preferences to more 
“analytic-based” choice behavior.  In light of these results it is important to ask 
to which extend frame-induced changes in emotional states lead decision-
makers to engage/disengage in visually guided comparisons.  Further 
investigations are necessary to determine the link between emotional and 
attentional components of decision-making.   
Previous investigations have examined context-dependent decisions 
by means of sequential sampling models (Bogacz et al., 2007; Tsetsos et al., 
2010, 2012, 2016; Usher and McClelland, 2004). These reports suggest that 
different frames induce changes on how decision-makers weight the available 
options.  However, a distinction of our study is that it provides for the first time 
evidence indicating that visually guided comparisons play a role in context 
dependent-preferences. 
 
General conclusions 
Most of the research on value-based decision-making and attentional 
processes has provided correlational data showing the strong coupling 
between gaze and choice patterns.  The first two studies presented in this 
thesis (Study 1 and 2) show that it is possible to exogenously modulate the 
influence of visual comparisons in value-based decisions.  Study 1 indicates 
that bi-hemispheric tDCS over the PPC can regulate the contribution of 
attended and unattended options in the decision-process.  This effect, in turn, 
leads to spatially biased decision-processes.  Results from Study 2 show that 
inhibitory TMS over the right FEF reduces the influence of visual comparisons 
in a spatial-independent manner. 
 Standard sequential sampling models include a stochastic component 
that allows them to replicate variability in choice behavior.  An advantage of 
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the aDDM is that it can explain variance in choices with an attentional 
mechanism, in addition noise.  In Study 3, we used a slightly different version 
of the aDDM to examine the effect of visual comparisons in context-
dependent decision processes.  Results from this study indicate that, in 
response to contextual information, subjects regulate their engagement in 
visual comparisons during their decisions.  Context-dependent changes in the 
influence of visual comparisons, in turn, lead to context-dependent choices 
 A key assumption of the aDDM (and the modified version in Study 3) is 
that, when comparing options, the value of the attended alternative is better 
integrated than the value of the unattended one.  Interestingly, this is line with 
research on attention in the perceptual domain. These investigations suggest 
that a main function of selective attention is to filter perceptual input and 
enhance contrast sensitivity and spatial resolution in favor of the attended 
region of the visual scene(Barbot et al., 2011; Carrasco, 2011; Herrmann et 
al., 2010; Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005; Pestilli et al., 2007).  The aDDM 
proposes a similar mechanism for the value processing.  More precisely, this 
model suggests that decision makers allocate more computational resources 
for the processing of the attended option value. 
 This idea is also in line with certain views of “bounded rationality” in 
decision-making (Simon et al., 1955).  According to this perspective, one 
intrinsic limitation of decision-makers is their limited capacity to process 
information the decision-problem, and this limitation is particularly 
disadvantageous when facing time constraints. 
  In conclusion, our findings indicate that the attention-related brain 
region such as the PPC and the right FEF are involved in the comparisons of 
values, and therefore, in preferential choices.  Furthermore, these attentional 
components of decision-making are involved in context-dependent changes of 
preferences. 
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Abstract 
In order to choose, a decision-maker has to compare the available options. 
Prior work on value-based choice suggests that this comparison process 
involves shifts in attentional focus between the choice options (Krajbich et al., 
2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). What remains unknown is whether the 
neural mechanisms underlying the comparison can be influenced so as to 
bias choices. We identified the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) as the region 
most likely to be involved in this process (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et 
al., 2004; Hare et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012; Kahnt et al., 2014; Polanía et 
al., 2014) and utilized bi-hemispheric transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) in order to bias neural excitability towards right or left PPC while 
human subjects performed a value-based decision task. Compared to sham 
stimulation, both types of tDCS caused distinct effects on choice behavior, 
particularly for high-value trials. These effects manifested as either a choice 
bias towards the left option with left anodal-right cathodal (LA-RC) tDCS or a 
decrease in response time and choice consistency with left cathodal-right 
anodal (LC-RA) tDCS. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
the tDCS protocol merely affects the direction of spatial attention; they rather 
concur with the notion that the stimulation affects a dynamic comparison 
process in which evidence is discounted more strongly for unattended 
alternatives. Our findings suggest that a specialized neural process discounts 
unattended options in value-based choice and that this function can be altered 
by electrical stimulation.   
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Introduction 
Growing evidence suggests that overt visual attention has an important 
influence on choices when a decision-maker has to choose between different 
rewards (value-based decisions) (Lim et al., 2011; Towal et al., 2013; 
Cavanagh et al., 2014; Schonberg et al., 2014; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015).  
Furthermore, recent investigations have shown that value-based decision can 
be characterized with an attentional version of a drift-diffusion model (aDDM) 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).  Like other sequential 
sampling models (Bogacz et al., 2006; Mulder et al., 2014), the aDDM 
proposes that a choice results from a continuous accumulation of evidence in 
favor of the options.  However, a key distinction of the aDDM is that evidence 
is temporarily biased in favor of the option under the focus of attention 
because the other alternative is discounted (see Methods). 
Despite behavioral evidence consistent with this modulatory role of 
attention for value-based decisions (Armel, Beaumel, Rangel 2008; Lim, 
O’Doherty, Rangel 2011; Towal et al., 2013), the issue of causality remains 
contentious.  It is particularly unclear whether it is possible to manipulate the 
neural mechanisms underlying this biased comparison process in order to 
influence choice.  To answer this question, we here focused on the posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) and tested two competing hypotheses about how 
stimulation of this brain area may influence value-based choices.   
Our first hypothesis was based on numerous findings that the human 
right PPC is a crucial area for the orienting of visual attention.  Lesions of the 
right human parietal cortex can induce attentional biases towards the right 
side of the visual scene, and these effects are less frequent and weaker when 
the left parietal cortex is damaged (Kinsbourne, 1977; Vuilleumier et al., 1996; 
Corbetta et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2013). Moreover, inhibitory transcranial 
magnetic (TMS) or direct current (tDCS) stimulation over the right PPC can 
also induce an increased focus towards the right visual field (Hilgetag et al., 
2001; Nyffeler et al., 2008; Sparing et al., 2009). Interestingly, compared to 
unilateral tDCS, this effect is particularly pronounced and appears earlier with 
bilateral left-anodal/right-cathodal (LA-RC) stimulation (Giglia et al., 2011). 
Thus, the first hypothesis we tested is that subjects receiving LA-RC tDCS 
over PPC will have an attentional bias towards options presented on the right 
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side of the display and will therefore be more likely to choose this alternative, 
relative to a sham group without neurally effective tDCS.   
Our second hypothesis was based on decision-making studies 
suggesting an involvement of the PPC in both the processing of value (Platt 
and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004; Hare et al., 2011; Polanía et al., 
2014) and the accumulation of evidence underlying choices (Roitman and 
Shadlen, 2002; Heekeren et al., 2004; Filimon et al., 2013).  Together with the 
aDDM framework, these results suggest that neural processes in parietal 
cortex could implement the attentional discounting operation that weakens the 
impact of unattended options on the value comparison process.  We therefore 
tested the hypothesis that tDCS will differentially change the discount of 
unattended options depending on the electrode montage: A subject under LA-
RC stimulation would more strongly discount the unattended option on the 
right side of the visual field (when focusing on the left alternative) than the 
unattended left option (when focusing on the right alternative). As a 
consequence, this subject would accumulate evidence in a biased fashion 
towards the left option (contrary to the purely attention-based hypothesis 
outlined in the previous paragraph). Conversely, LC-RA stimulation would 
lead to a stronger discount of the unattended left option than the unattended 
right option, thereby biasing the evidence accumulation process towards the 
right alternative.   According to the aDDM, these evidence accumulation 
biases would particularly affect choices between options with higher overall 
value because of the multiplicative effect of the attentional discount. 
We tested the prediction of both these hypotheses and, as detailed 
below, our results provide no support for the first hypothesis and are more 
consistent with the second hypothesis.  
 
Materials and methods 
Experimental procedure. Forty human (16 females, mean age +/- SD = 21.3 
+/- 1.96) subjects without a history of implanted metal objects, seizures or any 
other neurological or psychiatric disease participated in the experiment. In a 
first task, subjects rated 148 food items (average duration of 9 minutes and 57 
seconds, SD = 1 minute and 11 seconds). Every food item was presented 
individually on a computer screen for 2 seconds, followed by a rating screen 
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(free response time). Subjects were instructed to press the space bar for 
those food items that they did not like at all and to rate the remaining items on 
a scale from 0 to 10 based on how much they would like to eat that food at the 
end of the experiment. This rating task gave us a measure of the subjective 
value for each food item and allowed us to exclude disliked items (Figure 1A). 
In a second task (average duration of 15 minutes and 15 seconds, SD = 2 
minute and 58 seconds), participants made 195 decisions between pairs of 
positively rated food items. In each trial, one of the food items was presented 
on the left and the other on the right side of the screen. Decisions were self-
paced and were made using the computer keyboard (Figure 1 B). The food 
items we presented were selected such that – for each participant – the 
difference in ratings between the left and right items (VD = left item value - 
right item value) was constrained to be -1, 0 or +1, with an equal number of 
trials (65) of each. This was done to focus on difficult choice problems where 
tDCS-induced changes in the decision process would be more likely to 
change the choice outcomes. Subjects knew that at the end of the 
experiment, one trial would be selected at random and that they had to eat the 
food item that they chose in that trial. Subjects were asked not to eat for three 
hours before the experiment and after the experiment they stayed for thirty 
minutes in a waiting room where they ate the selected food item. Both tasks 
were programmed in Matlab 2012b (Matworks), using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007).  
 
Stimulation. Subjects performed the choice task while receiving bi-
hemispheric tDCS over the posterior parietal cortex (PPC). This technique 
consists of applying a constant low electrical current between two electrodes 
mounted at the scalp in order to reduce (under cathodal electrode) or increase 
(under anodal electrode) cortical excitability (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000). One 
group of subjects (n = 14) received left cathodal–right anodal stimulation (LC-
RA), a second group (n = 13) received left anodal–right cathodal stimulation 
(LA-RC), and a third group received Sham stimulation (n = 13). As mentioned 
above, bilateral tDCS was chosen as it has been shown to induce stronger 
attention-related effects than unilateral stimulation during visual decision tasks 
(Sparing et al., 2009; Giglia et al., 2011). Stimulation was delivered with a 
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constant-current stimulator (neuroConn GmbH, Ilmenau, Germany) and a pair 
of rubber (5 x 5 cm) electrodes. Complying with current safety guidelines 
(Nitsche et al., 2003; Lyer et al., 2005), a constant current of 1mA intensity 
was applied. In line with montage used in the investigations mentioned above, 
the electrodes were placed over P3 and P4 of the international 10–20 system 
for electroencephalography electrode placement. For all subjects, stimulation 
started three minutes before the beginning of the choice task. For the non-
sham subjects (LA-RC and LC-RA groups), stimulation started with a gradual 
ramp-up of the current during 30 seconds and it ended once all choices were 
complete. Subjects in the Sham stimulation group received the same 30 
seconds ramping-up stimulation period - which provides a good control by 
mimicking the skin sensations at the onset of the current without resulting in 
measurable neural effects (Gandiga et al., 2006) - followed by a 30 seconds 
period when current gradually ramped-down to zero.  
 
General Setup. The experiment (including both the rating and choice task) 
was conducted in the computerized group room of the Laboratory for Social 
and Neural Systems research (SNS-Lab). The group room comprises 14 
identical computer workstations that are interconnected and shielded in view 
from one another. The experiment was conducted in several sessions and 
each session included multiple subjects (average 12 subjects per session). 
For each session, subjects were randomly and evenly divided into the three 
stimulation groups. A multi-channel tDCS system (from NeuroConn, Ilmenau, 
Germany) was used to simultaneously stimulate each of the participants with 
either LA-RC, sham, or LC-RA tDCS in each session. This group testing of 
participants thus controlled for unspecific effects, such as order, experimenter, 
and time of day effects that may potentially confound serial testing regimes.  
 
Computational model and statistical analysis. The aDDM decomposes the 
underlying decision-making process as follows: when a subject focuses on the 
left option, the relative decision value (RDV) progresses according to  
Vt = Vt-1 + d(rleft - θ1rright) + ξ  
and when the subject is focused on the right option, the RDV changes 
according to  
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Vt = Vt-1 + d(θ2rleft - rright) + ξ.  
Vt is the value of the RDV at time t, d is a constant that controls the speed of 
change (in units of ms−1), and rleft and rright denote the values of the two 
options. θ1 and θ2 (between 0 and 1) are the weights that discount the right or 
left item when not fixated. In other words, these parameters capture the effect 
of attentional focus that biases value comparisons. The model implies that the 
influence of attentional focus on the decision process increases when both 
options have higher values because of the multiplicative effect of these 
discount parameters. ξ is white Gaussian noise with variance σ12 or σ22 
depending on which item is being fixated (randomly sampled once every 
millisecond). The upper boundary (UB) corresponds to the left item and the 
lower boundary (LB) to the right item. In the standard aDDM, θ1 = θ2, UB = 
LB, and σ1 = σ2. However, we examined whether tDCS might break the 
symmetry and create a lateralized bias in the model. 
We tested two competing hypotheses about how tDCS on the PPC 
would affect the comparison process underlying value-based choices. 
According to the first hypothesis, LA-RC stimulation (compared to sham 
tDCS) would lead to a greater likelihood of choosing the right option, due to 
an increased propensity to orient attentional focus towards that option. The 
alternative second hypothesis we tested was that bilateral tDCS over the PPC 
would modulate the contribution of items outside the focus of attention on the 
evidence-accumulation process, by changing the discounts θ1 and θ2 in the 
aDDM. Whereas the first hypothesis mainly stipulates a main effect of LA-RC 
stimulation on choice, the second hypothesis implies (1) that both tDCS 
montages would affect the decision-process in different ways and (2) that 
these tDCS modulations would affect choice behavior more strongly on trials 
with higher OV because of the multiplicative effect of the discounts.  
To examine this hypothesis, we used the aDDM to identify the simplest 
possible changes in the value comparison process that could account for the 
observed pattern of behavioral results. In other words, we examined which 
stimulation-induced parameter changes in the aDDM can account for the 
pattern of observed choices and response times across stimulation groups. 
To test how the effects of the different tDCS montages could best be 
explained, we simulated different models and compared their predictions with 
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the empirical results (see Table 1). This set of models (Models 1-3) formalized 
how tDCS may have modulated the influence of attentional focus on evidence 
accumulation by changing the parameters θ1 and θ2. According to Model 1, 
the discounting of the right unattended option is stronger (q1 becomes 
smaller) under LA-RC stimulation relative to Sham stimulation, whereas LC-
RA stimulation increases the discounting of the left unattended alternative (q2 
becomes smaller). Model 2 implies that LA-RC stimulation decreases the 
discount of the left unattended alternative (q2 becomes higher), whereas LC-
RA stimulation decreases the discount of the right unattended option (q1 
becomes higher). Model 3 assumes that the discounting of both options 
increases with LA-RC, and decreases with LC-RA stimulation. We additionally 
simulated an analogous set of models (Models 4-6) formalizing that tDCS may 
have injected or reduced noise in the decision process, by changing the 
parameters σ1 and σ2. Finally, a third set of models (Models 7-9) was based 
on the assumption that stimulation may have modified the amount of net 
accumulated evidence required to implement a choice, by changing UB and 
LB. For simplicity, these three sets of models only considered symmetrical 
effects of the two tDCS treatments on the values of the θ, σ, or the choice 
barrier (UB, LB) parameters. 
We used the R package for statistical analysis of the behavioral results 
from the decision task (lme4 extension) and to perform the model simulations. 
Each trial from the Sham group was simulated with the parameters obtained 
in previous investigations with healthy non-stimulated subjects (Krajbich et al., 
2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Note that, unlike these previous 
investigations, our aDDM does not impose a single discount factor for the 
unattended option but allows for different discount factors for an unattended 
right (θ1) or left (θ2) food item (Table 1). Each trial in the binary choice task 
was simulated 100 times with each model. Each trial simulation started with a 
higher probability of an initial fixation towards the left food image (p=0.74, as 
reported in Krajbich et al., 2010) and fixations alternated between the left and 
right food images until the RDV reached a choice barrier. To simulate the 
pattern of shifts in attentional focus, we used the distribution of fixation 
durations observed in a similar food-choice experiment (Krajbich et al., 2010). 
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In line with the simulation procedure from that previous experiment, the 
periods of attentional focus were sampled randomly from the empirical 
distribution of non-last fixations, conditional on whether the fixation was the 
first or non-first of the trial. To examine the effects of different 
parameterizations of the aDDM, we performed logistic regressions with 
choices as the dependent variable and value differences (VD), overall values 
(OV) and interactions with stimulation group dummies as independent 
variables; the data from the sham group served as baseline in this 
regressions. Additionally, we performed linear regressions on reaction times 
as the dependent variable. These linear regressions were similar except that 
we used the absolute value difference (|VD|) as an independent variable, 
instead of the VD.  
 
Results 
Decision behavior  
Our first hypothesis implies that LA-RC stimulation increases subjects’ 
propensity to focus on the right side of the screen, thereby generally 
increasing the probability of choosing the option on the right side. Whereas 
this hypothesis mainly implies a main effect of LA-RC, our second hypothesis 
stipulates that both tDCS montages will differentially modulate the contribution 
of items outside the focus of attention during the decision process. Moreover, 
whereas our first hypothesis does not involve predictions on OV, our second 
hypothesis implies that higher OV leads to both larger effects of attentional 
focus on choice and shorter response times (RTs) (see Materials and 
Methods for more details). To test these two alternative hypotheses, we 
analyzed possible stimulation effects on subjects’ choices. We ran a mixed-
effects regression of choices as the dependent variable on value difference 
(VD = left item value – right item value), OV and stimulation group dummies 
as independent variables. We also included interactions of OV and VD with 
the stimulation group dummies and random effects to account for repeated 
within-subject measures (See supplementary table 1).  
Subjects in all three groups were more likely to choose the higher-
valued food item as the VD between the two items increased (p < 10-10), 
confirming that subjects were consistent with their earlier ratings. Relative to 
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the baseline sham group, there was no main effect for any active tDCS 
montage (LA-RC: p = 0.10; LC-RA: p = 0.62). However, compared to the 
sham group, subjects receiving LA-RC stimulation were more likely to choose 
the left item as the OV increased (LA-RC x OV: p = 0.029) (Figure 1C Bottom 
Left). Note that this choice bias towards the left alternative is opposite to the 
one expected under our first hypothesis, and depends on OV as expected 
under our second hypothesis. 
To test the predictions of the aDDM on RTs, we ran an analogous 
linear mixed-effects regression on RTs (Supplementary table 2). There was 
no main effect of any stimulation group or |VD| (LA-RC: p = 0.41; LC-RA: p = 
0.17; |VD|: p = 0.33), nor any interaction effects between stimulation groups 
and |VD| (LA-RC x |VD|: p = 0.24; LC-RA x |VD|: p= 0.28).  However, 
consistent with our second hypothesis, this analysis confirmed that subjects 
chose faster in trials with higher OV (p < 0.014); this effect was stronger for 
subjects receiving LC-RA stimulation (LC-RA x OV: p = 0.005) but not for 
subjects in the LA-RC group (LA-RC x OV: p = 0.16) (Figure 1C Top). 
Finally, we ran a third mixed-effects logistic regression to further 
identify any effects of tDCS on choice consistency (i.e., the likelihood of 
choosing the item with the higher rating). We only included choices between 
unequally rated items (VD ≠ 0) in this analysis. This analysis revealed a 
negative effect of LC-RA stimulation (p < 0.047), meaning that subjects with 
LC-RA stimulation made choices that were less consistent with their earlier 
ratings than subjects in the baseline Sham group (Figure 1C Bottom right). 
This effect was not observed with LA-RC stimulation (p = 0.95) 
(Supplementary table 3). 
 
Computational model simulations 
The behavioral results observed in our experiment are inconsistent with the 
first hypothesis because we do not observe a choice bias towards the right 
item in the LA-RC group. Can our second hypothesis – which stipulates that 
our two tDCS treatments induce changes in the discount factors θ1 and θ2 for 
the unattended options – provide a unifying explanation of all the behavioral 
regularities described above? To answer this question, we tested three 
different models (Models 1-3) that simulated symmetric tDCS-induced 
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changes in the values of the discounts θ. Additionally, we simulated 
analogous models in order to examine whether these behavioral patterns 
were induced by modulations of other aspects of the decision process, such 
as the noise (Models 4-6) or the net evidence required to implement the 
decisions (i.e. the upper and lower boundaries, Models 7-9). Only one of the 
simulated aDDMs replicated the effects on choice, RTs and accuracy (Table 
1). This model is based on the idea that LA-RC and LC-RA stimulation 
produce symmetric changes in the discount parameters θ1 and θ2. More 
precisely, the model assumes that LA-RC stimulation increases the 
discounting of an unattended right item (decrease in θ1) whereas LC-RA has 
a symmetric effect of increasing the discounting of an unattended left item 
(decrease in θ2) (Figure 2 D and E). In line with the data, this model produces 
choice biases that are amplified as OV increases (Figure 2 B and C). 
One might wonder how a symmetric bias in attentional discounting 
produces an asymmetric bias in the choice behavior. We believe that the key 
towards understanding this is that subjects show a robust tendency to start 
exploration with an initial gaze towards the left side of the visual scene (Butler 
et al., 2005; Dickinson and Intraub, 2009; Foulsham et al., 2013; Ossandón et 
al., 2014), leading to an initial bias in the accumulation of evidence towards 
the left option (Krajbich et al., 2010). This initial tendency to focus on the left 
item, coupled with the extra discount on the right item from the LA-RC 
stimulation, leads to more choices of the left item. On the other hand, 
although LC-RA stimulation causes an extra discount of the unattended left 
item, this bias against choosing left is counteracted by the subjects’ strong 
general tendency to focus on the left item first. In other words, with LC-RA 
stimulation, the initial phase of evidence accumulation is not strongly 
supporting one alternative over the other, and the decision process is 
determined by the subsequent shifts of focus, leading to more-error prone 
choices. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to evaluate how modulations of neural activity 
in the PPC influenced the comparison process underlying value-based 
decisions. To do so, we examined two competing hypotheses on how bilateral 
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tDCS on the PPC may influence this process. The first of these hypotheses 
was derived from previous studies of tDCS effects on visual attention and 
predicted that LA-RC stimulation would lead to an increased tendency to 
choose the option presented on the right side of the visual scene. The second 
hypothesis was based on the decision process described by the aDDM and 
implied that LA-RC and LC-RA stimulation would modulate the contribution of 
alternatives out of focus on evidence accumulation. 
The results of our experiment showed a complex pattern of choice 
behavior that could not be explained by our first hypothesis. As predicted by 
the aDDM, decisions with higher OV led to faster responses in our three 
groups of subjects, and this effect increased with LC-RA stimulation. 
Additionally, LA-RC stimulation increased the likelihood of choosing the left 
option, but mainly in decisions with high OV. Finally, LC-RA stimulation led to 
a decrease in choice consistency. 
On the basis of aDDM simulations, we were able to rationalize these 
regularities with a simple symmetric modulation of the discount parameter θ 
and provide evidence in favor of our second hypothesis. Our modeling results 
indicate that bilateral tDCS of the PPC was most likely to decrease evidence 
accumulation for unattended items ipsilateral to cathodal stimulation and 
contralateral to anodal stimulation. In other words, these results suggest that 
our bilateral montage of LA-RC (LC-RA) increases the discount in the 
evidence accumulation process for an unattended right (left) option but has no 
effect on the discount factor for an unattended left (right) option. 
This explanation suggests that the effects induced by tDCS impacted 
on the value computation and/or comparison process rather than on spatial 
attention per se, since the observed choice biases are opposite to what would 
be predicted by reported effects of our tDCS montage on the distribution of 
spatial attention in simple visual tasks. For instance, recent investigations 
using simple perceptual judgments have shown that cathodal tDCS over the 
right PPC induces a rightward bias and that this effect is greater with bi-
hemispheric LA-RC stimulation (Sparing et al., 2009; Giglia et al., 2011). It is 
important to emphasize that our results do not contradict these data. Those 
studies involved perceptual judgments (e.g., bisection of horizontal lines) in 
order to measure subtle changes in the allocation of spatial attention, while 
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our study involved lengthy comparisons between value representations of 
highly salient food images. These high-resolution images are powerful visual 
stimuli and unlikely to be neglected as a result of tDCS. Furthermore, please 
note that the observed behavioral effects are also unlikely to be due to other 
task-general factors such as motor biases, since they were systematically 
amplified in decisions involving high OV, as predicted by the aDDM (Figure 2 
C). 
It is important to note that the space of models that we tested was by 
no means exhaustive. Our goal was to find the most parsimonious 
explanation for the observed behavioral effects. It may be the case that other 
more complicated explanations could also provide an explanation for the 
observed regularities. However, even with the restriction to symmetric effects 
on the discount parameters, we were able to provide a unifying explanation of 
the observed behavioral regularities.  
An important question raised by our results is how tDCS affects 
interconnected areas within the same hemisphere during value-based 
decisions. Recent work suggests that synchronized fronto-parietal activity is a 
neural fingerprint of value-based choices (Hunt et al., 2012; Polanía et al., 
2014, Siegel et al. 2008) and it is possible that the effects of our tDCS 
montage involve reduced sensitivity of parietal areas for signals originating in 
frontal cortex (Polania et al, 2015). Another important question concerns the 
specific contributions of anodal and cathodal stimulation in these behavioral 
patterns, which is generally unclear for the standard montage we employed 
here based on previous work (Sparing et al., 2009; Giglia et al., 2011). 
Theories of inter-hemispheric competition emphasize the role of mutually 
inhibitory connections between homologous brain areas across hemispheres 
(parietal, frontal and collicular regions) (Sprague, 1966; Kinsbourne, 1977; 
Kapur, 1996). According to this view, mutual inhibition leads to an adequate 
distribution of neural activity between hemispheres. Several investigations 
suggest that causal manipulations of neural activity in these areas lead to 
asymmetric inter-hemispheric interaction and, therefore, biases in motor and 
perceptual functions (Funk and Pettigrew, 2003; Kobayashi et al., 2004; 
Weddell, 2004; Hummel and Cohen, 2006; Sparing et al., 2009; Takeuchi et 
al., 2009; Giglia et al., 2011; Lefebvre et al., 2012; Wright and Krekelberg, 
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2014; Filmer et al., 2015). Our study provides suggestive evidence for the role 
of these inter-hemispheric dynamics in value-based choice and motivates 
further research into the precise underlying mechanisms. 
To summarize, we combined tDCS and computational modeling 
techniques to demonstrate that value-based choices can be manipulated by 
stimulating PPC. Our results support the idea that bilateral tDCS over the 
PPC causes a symmetric spatial bias in the accumulation of value 
information, resulting in biased choices. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Experiment. (A) Rating task. Subjects rated a series of food items from 0 to 
10. Disliked items were excluded by pressing the space bar of the computer keyboard 
(represented by the white rectangle at the bottom of the rating screen). (B) Choice 
task. Subjects were asked to fixate the center cross for 2 seconds. Then two images 
of food items were presented on the left and the right side of the screen, respectively, 
and subjects selected (without a time limit) the item they wanted to consume later, at 
the end of the experiment. After the decision was made, a red box highlighted the 
selected item. (C) Behavior conditional on stimulation group and overall value (low vs. 
high). Top: Reaction times (RTs) binned in quantiles. For visualization purposes, the 
first and last quantile are not shown. Bottom Left: Probability of choosing the left item 
as a function of overall value and tDCS group. Bottom Right: Probability of choosing 
the best item as function of tDCS group.	
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Figure 2. Computational modeling framework. (A) The best model increases the 
discounting of the right unattended (lowers q1 : q’1 < q1) option under LA-RC stimulation, 
while under the LC-RA stimulation, it increases the discounting of the left unattended 
alternative (lowers q2 : q’2 < q2). (B) This model implies that the RDV progresses in favor of 
the attended item. LA-RC stimulation biases the RDV towards the upper boundary (left 
item) while LC-RA stimulation biases the RDV towards the lower boundary. (C) The RDV 
progresses faster in decisions with high overall value, leading to faster choices and stronger 
modulations of tDCS in choice. (D) Example of the tDCS effects on value comparisons in to 
our model when both items have a rating value of 4. The gray area signals the focused 
item. Our model implies that the item out of focus has a disadvantage relative to the item in 
focus because only a fraction of its value is computed during the comparison process. LA-
RC stimulation further increases the disadvantage of the item in the right visual periphery, 
while the disadvantage of the item in the left visual periphery is increased with LC-RA 
stimulation. (E) In decisions with high OV, the disadvantage of items out of focus and the 
effects of tDCS are stronger. 
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Model 
Parameter 
modified 
Group Effect 
Sham 
LA-
RC 
LC-
RA 
Choice 
bias 
RTs Accuracy 
VD 
LA-
RC 
* 
OV 
OV 
LC-
RA 
* 
OV 
LC-RA 
Model 
1 
θ1 0.3 0.1 0.3 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
θ2 0.3 0.3 0.1 
Model 
2 
θ1 0.3 0.3 0.5 
✔ ✔ ✔   
θ2 0.3 0.5 0.3 
Model 
3 
θ1 0.3 0.1 0.5 
✔ ✔ ✔   
θ2 0.3 0.1 0.5 
Model 
4 
σ1 0.02 0.005 0.02 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
σ2 0.02 0.02 0.005 
Model 
5 
σ1 0.02 0.02 0.04 
✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
σ2 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Model 
6 
σ1 0.02 0.01 0.03 
✔  ✔  ✔ 
σ2 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Model 
7 
UB 1 0.7 1 
✔  ✔  ✔ 
LB 1 -1 -0.7 
Model 
8 
UB 1 1 1.3 
✔  ✔   
LB 1 -1.3 -1 
Model 
9 
UB 1 0.7 1.3 
✔  ✔   
LB 1 -1.3 -0.7 
 
Table 1. Models used to simulate the choices in the decision task. Parameter values to 
simulate the decisions corresponding to the Sham group were taken from Krajbich et al., 
2010. Only Model 1 reproduced all the effects of Left anodal – Right cathodal (LA-RC) 
and Left cathodal – Right anodal (LC-RC) stimulation (as indicated by the symbol ✔ in 
each column). UB and LB denote Upper Boundary and Lower Boundary. VD denotes the 
difference between the rating values of the left and the right item. Ov denotes overall 
value. 	
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Supplementary material 
 
 
 
 
  Coefficient Standard Error Z value P value  
Intercept 0.11 0.08 1.42 0.15 
LA-RC -0.20 0.12 -1.64 0.10 
RA-LC -0.06 0.12 -0.50 0.62 
VD 0.64 0.10 6.67 2.63e-11 
OV -0.01 0.01 -1.23 0.22 
LA-RC x VD -0.09 0.15 -0.61 0.54 
LA-RC x OV 0.03 0.01 2.18 0.029 
LC-RA x VD -0.21 0.14 -1.46 0.14 
LC-RA x OV 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.59 
VD x OV  0.00 0.01 0.20 0.84 
LA-RC x VD x OV 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.59 
LC-RA x VD x OV 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.84 
 
Supplementary table 1  
Logistic mixed-effects regressions on the probability of choosing left option.  
Dependent variable equals 1 if the safe option is chosen and 0 otherwise. 
Subject identity was used as a random effect to account for repeated 
measures.  
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  Coefficient Standard Error Z value P value 
Intercept 0.75 0.09 8.54 2e-16 
LA-RC 0.10 0.13 0.81 0.42 
RA-LC 0.17 0.12 1.36 0.17 
|VD| -0.04 0.04 -0.96 0.34 
OV -0.01 0.00 -2.47 0.013 
LA-RC x  |VD| 0.07 0.06 1.17 0.24 
LA-RC x OV 0.01 0.00 1.40 0.16 
LC-RA x  |VD| 0.06 0.06 1.08 0.28 
LC-RA x OV -0.01 0.01 -2.81 0.005 
|VD| x OV 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.31 
LA-RC x |VD| x OV -0.01 0.01 -1.45 0.15 
RA-LC x |VD| x OV -0.01 0.01 -0.87 0.38 
 
Supplementary table 2  
Linear mixed-effects regression on reaction times (RTs). The dependent 
variable is the log of the RTs (which were measured in milliseconds).  This log 
transform was performed to account for the skewed distribution of the RTs.  
Subject identity was used as a random effect to account for repeated 
measures. 
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  Coefficient Standard Error Z value P value 
Intercept 0.66 0.07 10.00 <2e-16 
LA-RC -0.01 0.09 -0.06 0.95 
RA-LC -0.18 0.09 -1.99 0.047 
|VD| -0.01 0.05 -0.21 0.84 
LA-RC x  |VD| 0.03 0.07 0.44 0.66 
LC-RA x  |VD| 0.04 0.07 0.61 0.54 
 
Supplementary table 3 
Logistic mixed-effects regressions on the probability of choosing best option.  
Dependent variable equals 1 if the best option is chosen and 0 otherwise. 
Subject identity was used as a random effect to account for repeated 
measures. For this regression, only trials with an absolute value difference 
(|VD|) different from 0 were included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
